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THE UNCERTAINTIES AND CHALLENGES AHEAD :A SOUTHERN PERSPECTIVE
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European security issues were relatively straightforward till the end of the bipolar world in the 1980s. Even the definition of Europe was quite easy as the continent was divided into two rival and opposing camps.

Since 1990, we gradually moved from the concept of simple security as perceived in a bipolar world to one of extended or multidirectional security. This new concept of extended security has to do with the additional and mostly non-military aspects of security. It also involves the acknowledgement that security embraces more complex notions and dimensions. In particular, challenges of an economic character that affect security have started to attract increasing attention. In Europe, pressures arising from demands related to human rights and environmental standards began to carry a similar weight to military challenges. In short, we have learned the lesson that security in the narrow military sense is not fully adequate any more.

It has now become commonplace to state that risks of instability for Europe are shifting further and further to the south and south-east. If we list recent crises, open conflicts or instabilities, the validity of this premise can be seen more clearly: Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, Abkhazia, Chechnya, Iraq and the Gulf, the Arab-Israeli conflict. All these crises have one thing in common: they are in or around the Eastern Mediterranean basin. Let us now recall the new risks, what we sometimes call 'transnational risks', in generic terms: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, terrorism, explosion of immigration, illegal trafficking of arms and drugs, aggressive nationalism and xenophobia. Unfortunately, these risks are also most relevant for the same region.

One very clear conclusion can be drawn from this analysis: the security situation in the wider Eastern Mediterranean area can be described as being somewhere between 'not reassuring' and 'dangerous'. Most acute conflicts and risk factors seem to converge there.

To try to explore the root causes of the risk factors and instabilities in the region will be beyond the framework of this article. However, political and social instability, ethnic and national conflicts, and economic difficulties may all be cited as some of the main reasons.

We are constantly being reminded that the globe we inhabit and the continent we all share are becoming smaller and more integrated. Everywhere people try to forge closer links between societies. International organisations and regulations are binding states. We are aiming to move forward, to forge a truly international community.

As we move in this general direction, the first task facing us is to enhance a secure, stable and integrated environment. In such an environment, our concept of security should be an all-embracing one, taking into account the security needs of all countries, and taking care not to create new divisions, zones of influence or grey areas.

It seems that the new security architecture of the Euro-Atlantic region will be built on the pillars of:

- a transformed Atlantic Alliance and a robust transatlantic partnership,
 - the new consultative partnership forum of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the enhanced Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, as well as the new forums of co-operation and consultation between NATO and Russia and between NATO and Ukraine,
 - a deepening and enlarging European integration process that may also assume a security dimension in the not so distant future,
 - the Council of Europe and the OSCE as overarching roofs with their new institutions and co-operative mechanisms,
- and, finally, regional groupings, from the Baltic Council to the Black Sea Co-operation, from the Balkan initiatives to Economic Co-operation Organisation, although some of these do not yet have a security dimension.

It is evident that a re-designed Eurasia and an Euro-Atlantic community with interlocking systems and agencies are gradually taking shape.

The opportunities for co-operation and constructive dialogue stemming from this development cannot be underestimated. These organisations, initiatives and structured co-operative mechanisms help forge co-operative links based on mutual trust. But more needs to be done, in particular to promote confidence and to achieve true integration.

In such a security architecture, the North Atlantic Alliance will continue to be the bedrock of security. NATO not only brings the nations of Europe and North America together through the transatlantic link, but also continues to be the only effective and reliable defence organisation. The success of the NATO-led force in Bosnia-Herzegovina is ample proof of this fact.

On the other hand, a key concept in building a new Europe is integration. It is also the underpinning concept for the enlargement processes of the major European institutions. We cannot explain NATO enlargement in threat-driven terms, since it is us who have declared that the nature of the threat has changed and that the threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO's European fronts has effectively been removed and thus no longer provides the focus for Allied strategy. We base our enlargement process not on the logic of threat or confrontation (ie. old thinking) but on the concept of integration.

As such the Brussels Summit of 1994 was a major turning point for the Alliance, initiating as it did its internal and external adaptation process.

However, it seems that in the minds of many, the transformation of the Alliance is equated solely with the issue of enlargement. While enlargement is an important aspect of the Alliance's adaptation,

this notion does also include an enhanced PfP and the establishment of special relations with the Russian Federation and Ukraine, as well as the various aspects of internal adaptation.

Viewed within the context of the enlargement of NATO, the enhanced PfP, which aims to further develop and energise NATO's relations with its partners, is especially important for those partners who have not been invited to the first enlargement or for those who do not have the prospect of membership.

Moreover, enhanced PfP is not to be regarded as a consolation prize. It is a very important initiative and is the means through which a sense of security and, more crucially, a sense of belonging are projected to our partners. It also facilitates the involvement of partners in NATO's decision-making processes. The EAPC, by merging the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) with the PfP, retained the two basic and distinct characteristics of them both, namely the principle of equality of partners and the possibility of self-differentiation. This is a prudent mixture as it is suitable for both the needs of those partners who are more active, and those who are not able to be as active as they would like.

As I have already suggested, the Alliance has been in the forefront in adapting itself to the new security environment of the post-Cold War era. On the other hand, the Atlantic Alliance is still the only framework and the primary organ for a credible Euro-Atlantic collective defence.

For the Atlantic Alliance as such to remain credible, it has to uphold its core functions, albeit in a modified fashion.

The first commitment was, is and should continue to be collective defence of the Allies. Article five contingencies, including the nuclear dimension, may seem to be remote today, but they are still valid. On the other hand, indirect threats to the Alliance as a whole, or towards a group of allies, or an individual ally should also be seen in this respect. When one speaks about indirect threats, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction comes to the forefront.

Second, commitments of a collective security nature are a new, but important element of Alliance undertaking. The PfP framework document clearly states this undertaking towards PfP partners: "NATO will consult with any active participant in the partnership, if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security."

Third, we have to keep in mind NATO's new missions, such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, preventive deployment and sanctions enforcement. It goes without saying that the most important experience in this respect was gained in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I wish to reiterate here that these new missions, though essential, should not be seen to replace or even be considered at the same level as the Alliance's core functions.

Fourth, it is time to reflect upon and try to jointly address Alliance commitments against risks of a transnational nature. Terrorism, illicit transfer of arms and drugs, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and regional instabilities leading to mass migration can be cited among such challenges.

Fifth, projection of peace and stability to areas beyond the partners and the commitment to international peace and security as a whole should not be overlooked.

Even a cursory evaluation of the local challenges to European security and the multidirectional

global challenges that, by definition, would affect Europe, indicates a strong and valid justification of the need to retain a full transatlantic dialogue and reaffirms the importance of collective decisions and their implementation. Hence, co-ordinated and complementary policies to ensure successful responses to all these multidirectional challenges necessitate the full participation of the USA in such European endeavours.

With the end of the Cold War, Europe adopted a broad approach to security because of the radical changes in the security situation. The opportunities for achieving security objectives through political means have become greater than ever before. It has also become possible to draw consequences from the fact that security and stability have political, economic, social and environmental elements, as well as an indispensable defence dimension. For example, the NATO alliance has acknowledged this and stated in its strategic concept that “managing the diversity of challenges facing the Alliance requires a broad approach to security.”

A broad approach to security is required nowhere as much as in the Eastern Mediterranean region. The political aspect of this broad approach includes political dialogue among countries of the region, as well as other means of enhancing confidence. The economic aspect of the broad approach should involve, first and foremost, the opening up of all the economies of the region to the global economy and the entry of all the countries of the region into the world of international trade. At the same time, the economic take-off of the less prosperous countries could cement political reconciliation. Moreover, the risks of social and internal explosions could also be defused through strong economic dynamics. Nevertheless, given the military potential in the region and the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, this broad approach should also include a defence and military dimension. Multilateral arms control efforts, the establishment of confidence building measures, the utilisation of prevention, deterrence and defence against the risk of mass destruction weapons, as well as conventional military build-up, are among this category of measures.

Turkey’s position concerning the security situation in the Eastern Mediterranean is part of its overall security policy. Since Turkey regards NATO as the cornerstone of its security policy, it should not be surprising that the broad lines of Turkey’s approach to Eastern Mediterranean security concerns is not fundamentally different from that of her allies. Turkey’s geographical location naturally makes her more sensitive and vulnerable to specific security issues in the region and requires her to be more active in co-operative schemes.

Turkey also shares the view that her security cannot be isolated from that of the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey is perhaps more concerned with the conflicts and instabilities as well as the risk factors in the region. She believes, therefore, that a broad and comprehensive approach to security is needed.

Turkey’s overall perspective on NATO is shaped by three main factors. First of all, regardless of her membership in alliances, security has always been a major concern for Turkey, mainly due to her sensitive geopolitical situation. Second, during the last four decades, Turkey’s membership of NATO has been one of the main pillars of her foreign and security policy, not only because of NATO’s important security guarantee, but also because this membership is a clear manifestation of her Western vocation. As a manifestation of this orientation, Turkey aims to take the place she well deserves in all other European institutions. Third and finally, Turkey has been one of the major providers of security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, rather than being a net consumer.
