BRICS in the Changing World Order: Widening and Deepening Already?

In 2001, Jim O’Neill from Goldman Sachs predicted that Brazil, Russia, India, and China would emerge as leading global economies, coining the term "BRIC." The foreign ministers of these countries first met in 2006, with the first leaders' summit occurring in 2009 in Yekaterinburg, Russia. South Africa joined in 2010, forming BRICS. At the 15th BRICS Summit in Johannesburg in 2023, the group announced a second expansion: as of 2024, BRICS includes Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, marking the "BRICS+" era.

BRICS is an informal international organization, lacking a founding treaty, central headquarters, or a permanent secretariat. This informality allows BRICS to unite countries with diverse political systems, representing nearly 50% of the world’s population, around 20% of global trade, and more than 20% of global GDP. BRICS aims to amplify the voice of developing countries in global governance, arguing that they have been marginalized in the U.S.-centric world order. Through 16 annual summits, BRICS has expanded its agenda from economic and financial issues to include peace and security. BRICS's most concrete steps toward deepening integration have been in economic and financial governance reflected in the establishment of the BRICS Development Bank in 2014. The 2024 Summit in Russia showcased BRICS nations’ interest in various new global governance issues, from climate change to women’s roles in peace processes, as outlined in the 54-point “BRICS Joint Declaration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs” including the need for greater use of local currencies in BRICS transactions and further exploration of their potential on this area.

The BRICS countries emphasize development, multipolarity, non-intervention, and reform of global governance institutions through their summit declarations. However, BRICS members interpret these principles and priorities differently. Russia emphasizes multipolarity over development and aligns with a multipolar world order, asserting its great power identity. Brazil, under President Lula, views BRICS as crucial to its strategic autonomy policies, while BRICS aligns with South Africa’s developmental state vision and advocates for a greater voice for Africa in global governance. While Brazil, India, and South Africa stress human rights, China has distinct views on human rights and the right to development. Despite calls for reform, BRICS members disagree on details such as the United Nations Security Council reform. Brazil and India, part of the G4 group with Germany and Japan, advocate for permanent UN Security Council membership, a move opposed by China. Regarding norms like the Responsibility to Protect, BRICS lacks a common stance, generally aligning with the UN Charter and non-intervention in principle, but not always in practice. Although intragroup trade has increased since BRICS's establishment, significant inequalities exist, with Brazil, India, and South Africa facing substantial trade deficits with China. Power asymmetry among BRICS countries, which are politically and culturally very diverse, was already evident even before expansion.

Among BRICS nations, there has been a growing influence of China and Russia over the past decade exemplified by the declining prominence of the IBSA Dialogue Forum, established in 2003 to unite Brazil, India, and South Africa’s democratic coalition. The latest enlargement further marginalizes the idea of democratic BRICS countries, despite references to democracy and human rights in recent declarations.

States increasingly prefer informal international organizations like BRICS for policy coordination in global governance. This allows them to eschew the limitations of formal treaties and secretariats amid the crises of the liberal international order. Although highly bureaucratic and institutionalized formal international organizations have remained resilient, their longevity does not guarantee legitimacy and effectiveness. More importantly, there is a normative decline in the legitimacy and authority of the liberal international order, its norms, and institutions. The post-Cold War order envisioned that the spread of liberal values would bring peace and prosperity. While material progress was made in creating norms and institutions, moral progress—defined as the practice of humanity—has remained problematic. A significant portion of the world, including developing countries, has long been marginalized in key discussions shaping global affairs. These countries now seize opportunities to contest and seek status by engaging with informal international organizations like BRICS in a post-hegemonic world order. Tracing the two-decade history of BRICS shows that the organization is both widening and deepening, though a new vocabulary is needed to better understand the changing faces of multilateralism with the rise of informal institutions in global governance.

The views expressed here are those of the author.